How Does Corporate Investment Respond to Increased Entry Threat? by Frésard, Laurent & Valta, Philip
How Does Corporate Investment Respond to Increased Entry
Threat?
Laurent Fre´sard, University of Maryland
Philip Valta, University of Geneva and Swiss Finance Institute∗
December 15, 2015
Abstract
We study how product-market interactions affect investment. We use reductions of
import tariffs to examine how incumbents modify investment when the threat of rivals’
entry intensifies. Incumbents reduce investment by 7.2% in response to higher entry
threat. Consistent with a strategic behavior, the investment reduction varies across
market structures: it concentrates in markets in which competitive actions are strate-
gic substitutes, where deterring entry is costly and investment makes incumbents look
soft. Our results provide novel evidence on how and why firms’ interactions influence
corporate investment. (JEL F13, G31, L1)
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Firms do not operate in isolation, but they interact with rivals in the product market. They
invest resources to develop and promote new products, increase differentiation, and satisfy existing
customers to enhance their competitive position and ultimately maximize their value. The im-
portance of firms’ product-market interactions for corporate investment is the subject of a large
theoretical literature in finance and economics (Spence 1977; Dixit 1980; Fudenberg and Tirole
1984). Yet, despite a recent surge of interest for the implications of firms’ interactions and peer
effects among finance researchers, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on how interactions
with product market rivals influence firms’ investment choices.
The lack of evidence has two main origins. First, firms can use investment strategically to influ-
ence rivals’ decisions.1 The existence of such strategic behavior renders product-market structures
endogenous to firms’ investment, making it difficult to identify a causal link between product market
interactions and investment. Second, the theoretical predictions on how and why product-market
interactions matter for investment depend on elements of market structures that are typically dif-
ficult to measure in the data.
The goal of this paper is to address these empirical challenges. We examine how firms respond
to situations in which the threat of entry by new competitors suddenly increases. We measure
increases in entry threat using large reductions of import tariffs. We argue that, by lowering the
cost of entry for foreign rivals, these events generate plausibly exogenous variation in the likelihood
of entry faced by domestic firms. This variation enables us to estimate the causal effect of increased
entry threat on corporate investment.
We identify 91 significant reductions of import tariffs between 1974 and 2005 that occur in 74
unique U.S. manufacturing industries and affect 1,116 publicly listed firms. During these liberal-
ization episodes, the average import tariff drops by more than 50%. We estimate firms’ reaction to
changes in entry threat using a difference-in-differences specification surrounding tariff reductions.
We focus on short windows around tariff cuts because we are interested in firms’ reaction to in-
1Throughout the paper we use the term “strategic” to characterize situations in which a firm takes into account
the effect that its actions can have on other firms in its product market space.
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creased entry threat and not in rivals’ actual entry. This distinction is key for our analysis because
unlike other types of events that may affect firms’ profitability (e.g., demand or technology shocks),
firms can strategically influence the actions of potential entrants following a shock to entry costs to
protect their competitive advantage (Goolsbee and Syverson 2008; Ellison and Ellison 2011). We
thus compare the change in investment from one year before to one year after the tariff cut for firms
that operate in affected industries to that of similar firms that operate in unaffected industries and
that are matched on multiple dimensions.
We find that, on average, U.S. firms significantly reduce capital expenditures after tariffs de-
crease in their industry. The economic magnitude of the reduction is large. Relative to matched
firms, the capital expenditures of treated firms decline by 7.2% of capital following tariff cuts, a
16.7% drop relative to the investment level prior to the tariff cuts, or $9.27 million per firm. Our
estimates are robust to various specifications, such as modifications of the matching techniques,
matching covariates, estimation windows, or placebo tests.
We show that the results are unlikely to be driven by unobserved differences between affected
and unaffected industries, such as tariff cuts occurring in only declining industries, where growth
opportunities are disappearing. We find no differences in the investment, profitability, or sales
patterns between treated and matched firms over a three-year period preceding the reductions
of tariffs. Moreover, we find virtually no change in proxies for firms’ growth opportunities and
uncertainty in response to tariff cuts. Furthermore, the estimated reduction of investment remains
significant even after we control for various time-varying proxies for investment opportunities and
uncertainty. These results suggest that the investment decrease is not mechanically tied to lower
growth prospects or higher uncertainty after tariff reductions.
Instead, our results are broadly consistent with strategic investment models predicting that
incumbent firms could either decrease or increase investment in response to higher entry threat
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1984; Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer 1985). Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984) predict that when firms interact with rivals in the product market and face entry threats,
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the change in their investment following a decrease of entry costs should depend predictably on
three elements of market structure: (1) whether competitive actions are strategic substitutes or
complements, (2) whether firms can feasibly deter entry or need to strategically accommodate en-
try, and (3) whether investment signals that a firm will be a soft or a tough competitor. To further
understand whether the drop in investment following tariff cuts contains a strategic dimension, we
analyze the variation of incumbents’ response across these different market structures. We specifi-
cally focus on cross-sectional variations in investment responses that are unlikely to be observed if
firms’ behavior only reflects a nonstrategic response. In particular, we concentrate the analysis on
the nature of strategic interactions and on whether investment choices make firms look like tough
or soft competitors, because there is little reason to expect differential responses along these two
dimensions when firms’ investment response does not contain any strategic dimension.
We find that the reduction of investment is only observed in markets featuring competition in
strategic substitutes. The change in investment is negligible in markets featuring competition in
strategic complements. Moreover, we estimate that only firms with constrained financial resources
reduce investment after large tariff reductions. Arguably, because financially weak firms may not be
able to fund further investment if entry occurs, lower investment spending in response to tariff cuts
makes these firms credibly look “soft.” In addition, the reduction of investment is concentrated in
product markets in which the costs of entry are low–where it might be too costly for incumbents to
deter entry. We only observe an investment decline in markets in which firms are less protected by
natural barriers to entry, measured for instance by a low degree of product differentiation, a high
redeployability of assets, or high cash holdings of foreign rivals.
These cross-sectional results are broadly consistent with the idea that the reduction of invest-
ment following tariff cuts is partly strategic in that it can modify the actions of potential foreign
entrants. As such, the results highlight the importance of market structures for corporate invest-
ment. The fact that firms’ investment is related to product market characteristics is intuitive and
perhaps not surprising. The novelty of our analysis, however, is to identify empirically how and
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why product market specificities and the nature of interactions among firms shape their invest-
ment decisions. The heterogeneity in firms’ response to higher entry threat can have important
implications for the evaluation of a firm’s capital budgeting decisions (by investors, analysts, rivals,
or policy makers) and for the comparison of investment choices with industry peers. When firms
interact in the product market, ignoring the underlying market structures could lead to incomplete
conclusions about the adequacy of firms’ decisions.
Our findings primarily add to studies that examine the role of product market competition in
corporate finance, especially to the few empirical papers relating corporate investment to product
market structures (Khanna and Tice 2000; Akdogu and MacKay 2008; Simintzi 2013). Our paper
is distinct in three dimensions. First, we rely on plausibly exogenous variations from tariff changes
to identify the causal effect of entry threat on firms’ investment choices. Second, we concentrate
on firms’ investment response to entry threat, as opposed to investment behavior after entry has
occurred (measured with a concentration index, for instance). Third, because our sample covers a
wide range of industries and market structures, we can contrast mixed theoretical predictions and
hence shed new lights on the economic channels through which product-market interactions impact
corporate investment.
More generally, our paper is related to the large literature on corporate investment. The bulk of
existing studies focuses on how capital market imperfections, such as collateral constraints, agency
costs, or information asymmetries influence firms’ investment policy. It is well established empir-
ically that this type of imperfections affect corporate investment (see Stein 2003 for a survey).
However, much less is known about how interactions among firms relate to their investment deci-
sions. A recent stream of research indicates that such interactions matter. For instance, Dougal,
Parsons, and Titman (2015) show that firms’ investment is sensitive to the investment of other
firms located nearby, Foucault and Fre´sard (2014) show that firms’ investment depends on the
stock prices of their product market peers, and Shue (2013) and Fracassi (2014) show that the
similarity of investment between two firms increases with executives’ social ties. The results in this
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paper add to this literature by showing that the nature of interactions with rivals in the product
market–or the lack thereof–have implications for corporate investment.2
1 Testable Hypotheses
To discuss how and through which mechanisms an increase in entry threat affects a firm’s investment
when it interacts with rivals in the product market, we focus on the investment reaction of an
incumbent (a U.S. firm) in response to increased threat from new entrants (foreign rivals). We
distinguish between two types of explanations, depending on whether the incumbent accounts for
the effect of its investment on rivals’ actions, or whether it ignores such a strategic effect.
1.1 Nonstrategic explanations
When the incumbent ignores the effect of its investment on rivals, the effect of increased entry
threat depends solely on how the threat of new entry alters the incumbent’s expectation about
the marginal contribution of new capital to future profits–the marginal productivity of capital.3
Absent strategic actions, the incumbent’s marginal productivity of capital is exogenous to the level
of investment it chooses. In this setting, the incumbent is expected to lower investment in response
to higher entry threat, either because a higher threat modifies its expectation about future profits,
or because higher risk of entry raises uncertainty about future profits. Existing research indicates
that more intense competition in the product market may lower firms’ profits by putting pressure on
margins through thinner market shares or lower prices (Nickel 1996). Accordingly, the incumbent
is expected to decrease investment in response to higher entry threat, reflecting the erosion of
expected investment opportunities generated by a higher threat of rivals’ entry (Grenadier 2002;
Aghion et al. 2005).
2In addition, our findings also speak to the literature that studies the real effects of trade liberalization (for recent
surveys, see Tybout 2003 or Bernard et al. 2007). As emphasized by Neary (2010), most of the existing research
ignores the potential influence of strategic interactions among firms. Our findings suggest that interactions and the
resultant product market structures condition how firms respond to trade liberalization.
3In the language of the q theory of investment, this corresponds to marginal q. See, for instance, Lucas and
Prescott (1971) or Hayashi (1982).
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Higher entry threat could also increase the risk of the incumbent’s expected profits. Less
intense competition reduces uncertainty about future profits and also enables the incumbent to
smooth out fluctuations in profits (Gaspar and Massa 2006; Irvine and Pontiff 2009). The increase
in uncertainty associated with higher threat of entry could lead the incumbent to delay investment
spending, especially when investment is partly irreversible, creating a valuable option to wait
before investing. Indeed, real option models of investment predict that the option to wait and
delay investment increases with uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Abel and Eberly 1996).
Hence, if higher entry threat increases business uncertainty, the incumbent is expected to decrease
investment.
1.2 Strategic explanations
When the incumbent behaves strategically, it accounts for the fact that its investment affects rivals’
competitive behavior and thereby modifies the equilibrium distribution of expected profits in the
market. As a result, the incumbent’s marginal productivity of capital is endogenous to the chosen
level of investment. In this context, the effect of higher entry threat is ambiguous. Fudenberg and
Tirole (1984) or Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) suggest that the incumbent’s reaction
depends on three distinct elements of product market structures. First, it depends on whether the
incumbent finds it advantageous to deter rivals’ entry or strategically accommodate their entry.
Second, it depends on the type of competition in the product market (i.e., Cournot or Bertrand),
which determines whether competitive choices are strategic substitutes or complements. Finally,
it depends on whether the investment choice of the incumbent makes it look like a tough or soft
competitor. Table 1 summarizes the predicted investment response to higher entry threat as a
function of each element (eight possible scenarios). We formally derive these predictions in the
Appendix using a simple two-period, two-firm model as in Tirole (1988).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The intuition is as follows. When entry deterrence is feasible, the incumbent wants to commit to
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being a tough competitor in the future to drive down the expected profits of rivals and render entry
unattractive. Therefore, if investment makes the incumbent look tough, it is optimal to increase
investment in response to higher entry threat so as to limit entry. This may happen, for instance,
when excess capacity credibly signals higher future quantity (or lower prices). By contrast, if
investment makes the incumbent look soft, it is optimal to decrease investment following higher
entry threat in an attempt to deter entry. This could happen in situations in which lower capacity
credibly signals greater future flexibility and faster competitive responses.
Alternatively, when entry deterrence is not feasible, the incumbent may strategically accommo-
date entry and still use investment to influence the rivals’ actions and equilibrium profits. In this
case, the sign of the incumbent’s investment response to higher entry threat depends on whether
investment makes the incumbent look tough or soft (as before), but also on whether firms’ actions
are strategic substitutes or complements. In particular, the incumbent should optimally increase
investment following increased entry threat if investment makes it look tough and actions are
strategic substitutes, or when investment makes the incumbent look soft and actions are strategic
complements. By contrast, we expect the incumbent to reduce investment in situations in which
investment makes it look tough and actions are strategic complements or when investment makes
the incumbent look soft and actions are strategic substitutes.
Because deterrence is infeasible, the incumbent’s objective is to maximize profits in the presence
of entrants. Therefore, it uses its investment to influence rivals’ equilibrium production (as opposed
to expected profits). When actions are strategic substitutes, the incumbent’s profits decrease
when rivals produce more. This arises typically in markets in which firms compete in market
shares, such as the food and beverage industry and the transportation industry (Kedia 2006).
Hence, the incumbent uses investment to strategically limit rivals’ production. This is achieved by
increasing investment if investment makes the incumbent look tough and by decreasing investment
if investment makes it look soft. When actions are strategic complements, the incumbent’s profits
increase when rivals produce more. This typically happens in markets in which firms compete
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on prices among differentiated goods (e.g., department stores, as described in Kedia 2006), or in
markets featuring important network effects. In this case, the incumbent’s objective is to induce
rivals to increase production. This is done by lowering investment when it makes the incumbent
look tough and by investing more when investment makes it look soft.4
1.3 Contrasting predictions
Overall, theory predicts that the incumbent may increase or decrease investment in response to
increased threat of entry. While observing an increase in investment is only consistent with a
strategic explanation, observing a decrease in investment could reflect both a strategic and non-
strategic response. To assess whether incumbents react strategically to increased entry threat, our
empirical strategy consists of three main steps. First, we use large reductions of tariffs across many
manufacturing industries and periods to identify how on average corporate investment responds to
a plausibly exogenous increase in entry threat. Second, by including a host of variables capturing
investment opportunities and uncertainty in our tests, we verify that our results cannot be solely
explained by nonstrategic explanations. Third, we exploit the multi-industry nature of our sample
to study whether firms’ investment reaction to lower entry costs varies across market structures as
predicted by the strategic explanation. We focus on cross-sectional variations that are unlikely to
be observed if firms’ behavior only reflects a nonstrategic response. In particular, we concentrate
on the nature of strategic interactions (strategic substitutes or complements) and whether invest-
ment choices make firms look like tough or soft competitors, because there is little reason to expect
differential responses along these two dimensions when firms’ investment response does not contain
4Existing research on strategic investment, which is mostly industry-specific, is broadly consistent with the hetero-
geneity of theoretical predictions. For instance, Gilbert and Lieberman (1987) report that larger capital investment
temporarily reduces rivals’ expansion in the chemical product sector. Focusing on the supermarket industry, Khanna
and Tice (2000) document that large and profitable incumbents raise investment after WalMart entered their market.
Simintzi (2013) reports that U.K. manufacturing firms invest more when rivals announce restructurings indicative of
a better competitive position. Cookson (2014) finds that incumbents expand capacity when threatened by a nearby
entry plan in the U.S. casino industry. By contrast, Smiley (1988) surveys corporate executives and finds no evidence
that firms increase investment to limit entry. Similary, Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) find no evidence that airlines
increase investment when threatened by the entry of Southwest. Khanna and Tice (2000) report a reduction of
investment for financially weak supermarkets following WalMart’s entry. Ellison and Ellison (2011) also find that
incumbents decrease investment in advertising prior to patent expiration in the pharmaceutical industry.
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any strategic dimension.5
2 Empirical Strategy and Data
2.1 Reductions of import tariffs
Over the last three decades, the U.S. authorities have gradually removed obstacles to international
trade and substantially reduced import tariffs on a large variety of goods and services. Andersen
and Van Wincoop (2004) emphasize that import tariffs amount to a significant fraction of overall
trade costs and, as a result, represent an important barrier to trade.6 In the U.S. manufacturing
sector the average tariff dropped by about 75% in thirty years, from 8.23% in 1974 to 2.15% in
2005. According to the vast literature on international trade, reductions of import tariffs lower
the cost of entering U.S. product markets, facilitating the penetration of foreign rivals on domes-
tic markets. Because goods and services supplied by foreign rivals become relatively cheaper on
domestic markets, reductions of import tariffs magnify the threat of entry by foreign competitors.
This idea forms the backbone of our tests.
To capture this idea in the data, we follow Fre´sard (2010) and identify significant reductions
of import tariffs as events that decrease entry barriers.7 We measure reductions of import tariffs
at the industry level by using product-level import data compiled by Feenstra (1996), Feenstra,
Romalis, and Schott (2002), and Schott (2010). The data span the period 1974-2005 and include
508 manufacturing industries. Because tariff data are only available for manufacturing industries
(2000-3999 SIC codes), we restrict our focus to these industries. Products imported to the United
States are coded based on the Harmonized System (HS), which was established by the World
5Contrasts based on whether incumbents find it optimal to strategically deter or accommodate entry are less
specific to the strategic explanations, since this choice is likely related to underlying structural barriers to entry and
hence potentially linked to investment opportunities and business uncertainty.
6Other barriers to trade include nontariff policy barriers (e.g., quotas, import bans, or import licenses), trans-
portation costs (both freight costs and time costs), information costs, contract enforcement costs, costs associated
with the use of different currencies, legal and regulatory costs (e.g., employment or intellectual property laws), or
local distribution costs. See Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) for a survey on trade barriers.
7Several recent papers use the variation of tariffs to measure changes in competition, see, for example, Trefler
(2004), Lileeva and Trefler (2010), Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), Valta (2012), Xu (2012), or Barrot, Loualiche, and
Sauvagnat (2015).
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Customs Organization (WCO). Each product is assigned a ten-digit HS code. Feenstra (1996)
and Schott (2010) develop concordance tables that map each HS product code into four-digit SIC
codes.8 Using this mapping we compute, for each industry-year, the ad valorem tariff as the duties
collected by U.S. custom divided by the Free-on-Board value of imports. After merging the tariff
data with the firm-level accounting data from COMPUSTAT, we are left with 133 industries.
Next, we compare the tariff reduction in a given industry to the same industry’s average change
over the whole sample period. Specifically, we define a significant tariff reduction occurring in an
industry-year when the negative tariff change is three times larger than the industry’s average as
Cut#3. Because the coding of imports changed in 1989, we ignore the tariff changes that occurred
between 1988 and 1989. To make sure that tariff cuts truly reflect nontransitory and relevant
changes in the competitive environment, we exclude tariff cuts that are followed by equivalently
large increases in tariffs over the three subsequent years, as well as instances in which the tariff is
smaller than 1%. With this definition, we identify 91 events between 1974 and 2005. These events
occur in seventy-four unique industries.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here]
Figure 1 shows that the tariff reductions are not clustered in any specific period and that they
are in line with the recent U.S. trade history.9 This repartition helps to ensure that our tests do not
mix confounding effects that are time specific such as economic downturns or stock market booms
and busts. Figure 2 confirms that the average tariff plummets by almost 50% in affected industries,
from 4.60% one year prior to the event to 2.57% in the event year. In contrast, it declines by only
8% in other industries, from 3.33% to 3.04%. Although such a change might appear modest at first
sight, it is not.10
8Because HS codes are solely based on product characteristics, and SIC codes also take into account the method
of production, HS codes cannot be directly matched to SIC codes. As a result, it is possible that a given HS category
matches to several four-digit SIC codes. Yet, we find no case in which a specific product (HS code) was assigned to
multiples (four-digit) SIC codes in the industries that compose our sample.
9For instance, we identify large tariff cuts occurring in fourteen industries in 1976. This wave corresponds to the
implementation of preferential tariff arrangements under the so-called “generalized system of preferences (GSP)” on
various products from developing countries, such as wood products, cigarettes, electrical items, or toys (Baldwin and
Murray 1977).
10As a comparison, Trefler (2004) reports that the passage of the FTA between the United States and Canada in
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2.2 Empirical methods
To measure the effect of an increased threat of entry on firms’ investment decisions, we define firms
that operate in industries experiencing a tariff cut in a given year as the “treated” firms. Because
treated firms could significantly differ from unaffected firms, we compare them to matched firms.
From the set of nontreated firms, we construct a sample of “matched” firms that are similar to the
treated firms, except for the change in entry threat they experience. We select matched firms based
on characteristics one year before the event. For each treated firm we choose, with replacement,
its nearest neighbor from the group of all the firms that operate in a different four-digit SIC code
industry during the same year. We follow Almeida et al. (2012) and match firms on the basis
of their size (the logarithm of total assets), investment opportunities (Tobin’s q), cash flow, cash
holdings, and long-term debt-to-asset ratio.11
We estimate the following difference-in-differences specification on a sample comprising only
treated and matched firms:
Ii,j,t = βCUTj,t + θXi,j,t−1 + ηi + δt + εi,j,t, (1)
where i indexes firm, j indexes industry, and t indexes time. Ii,j,t is capital expenditures scaled by
the beginning of the year capital stock (net PPE). The variable of interest, CUTj,t, is a dummy
variable that equals one for treated firms (i.e., if the industry in which the firm operates experienced
a tariff cut over the last year) and zero for matched firms. We consider only the years that surround
each event (one year before and one year after) and exclude the year of the event to better isolate
the effect of the entry threat engendered by tariff cuts from that of actual entry.
The vector Xi,j,t contains control variables known to correlate with investment decisions that
1989 lowered the average tariff for Canadian products from 4% in 1988 to about 2% in 1992, and 1% in 1996. This
event is considered by international economists as a sizable event that affected U.S. firms on various levels. In terms
of magnitude, the average tariff cut in our sample is close to that generated by the FTA.
11We use a matching algorithm that simultaneously minimizes the Mahalanobis distance across all these matching
characteristics. For each treated firm i, we find a matched firm j such that the Mahalanobis distance between
the i’s and j’s covariates (matching variables) is the smallest. The Mahalanobis distance is given by: ‖Xi −Xj‖ =
((Xi−Xj)′W−1X (Xi−Xj))1/2, where X is a k-dimensional vector of covariates and W−1X is the inverse of the covariance
matrix of the covariates. In a robustness test we also use a propensity score matching estimator and obtain very
similar results.
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could be directly affected by tariff reductions. In particular, we control for potential changes in
expected profits between treated and matched firms after tariff reductions. We include firms’
Tobin’s q (measured as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets) in all
our estimations. Similarly, we control for the natural logarithm of assets and for cash flow. In
addition, we include firm fixed effects (ηi) to control for time-invariant differences across firms,
particularly fixed differences between treated and matched firms. Similarly, we include year fixed
effects (δt) to control for differences between time periods, such as aggregate shocks or common
trends. To account for potential correlation between observations, we cluster the error term εi,j,t
at the industry-year level (as in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).
To be considered in our final sample, treated and matched firms need to have no missing
observations for the matching variables for the years surrounding the event. We use accounting and
financial data from COMPUSTAT over the period 1974-2005. We exclude firm-year observations
for which information is not available and winsorize all ratios at the 1% level in each tail. Moreover,
we exclude observations with negative assets, sales, and capital expenditures, as well as observations
with sales growth larger than 500%. The Appendix details the definition of all variables. Our final
sample comprises 1,116 treated firms and the same number of matched firms. The matched firms
are from 120 different industries. On average, each treated industry is matched to firms operating
in 9.04 distinct industries.12
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the treated and matched firms during the year
that precedes the tariff reductions. Overall, the treated and matched firms are very similar. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reveal that there are no significant differences in the distributions of the
matching variables between treated and matched firms. The p-values range between 0.22 for cash
flow to 0.98 for the logarithm of total assets. In sum, the matching process removes any meaningful
12This heterogeneity further reduces the concern that our estimates are driven by specific links between treated and
matched industries. To make sure that treated and matched firms truly are from unrelated industries, we have also
used the 1992 input-output tables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and computed interindustry relatedness
following Fan and Lang (2000). Our results do not change if we remove from the matching sample industries that
are related to treated industries (relatedness coefficient larger than 5%).
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differences along matching observables from the two groups. We note, however, that treated firms
display a higher level of investment prior to the tariff reductions.
The main coefficient of interest in Equation (1) is β, which measures how on average treated
firms modify investment compared to matched firms following a large tariff reduction. For β to have
a causal interpretation, reductions of tariffs should satisfy two requirements. First, the occurrence of
these events should be unrelated to individual firms’ underlying investment opportunities. Second,
tariff reductions should generate relevant shifts in the threat of entry in U.S. product markets.
We provide several pieces of evidence supporting both conditions and present them in an Internet
Appendix for brevity. In the following, we focus our attention on the sign, the magnitude, and the
variation of β across market structures.
3 Firms’ Response to Entry Threat
3.1 Average response
Table 3 presents the results of our baseline specification (1). We observe that, all else equal, firms
respond to tariff cuts by significantly reducing investment. In Column 1, the coefficient on CUT has
a value of -0.072 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimate implies that from one
year before to one year after the tariff cut the ratio of capital expenditures to capital of treated firms
declines by 7.2 percentage points relative to the ratio of matched firms. This effect is economically
large: the investment drop represents a relative decline of 16.7% from the pre-event level of capital
expenditures and corresponds to an average decrease of $9.27 million per firm. Aggregating this
effect over firms and time, it amounts to an approximate $11 billion decline in capital spending over
thirty years (or $365 million decline per year). Across all estimations the control variables display
the expected signs. The reduction of investment in response to tariff cuts is also apparent when we
use aggregate industry data from the NBER-CES database that aggregate the total capital stock
of all public and private firms in manufacturing industries. Column 2 of Table 3 indicates that the
growth rate of the capital stock decreases significantly in affected industries compared to unaffected
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industries (taken as the industries forming the matched sample) following tariff reductions.
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 further displays the dynamic investment response to increased threat of entry. We
modify specification (1) by interacting the treatment dummy (CUT ) with (annual) event-time
dummies around the tariff cuts. Before the tariff reduction, treated and matched firms invest
similarly: the difference between the two groups is not distinguishable from zero. This result
indicates that treated firms do not modify investment in anticipation of the event. We observe a
clear temporal break in the investment pattern of treated firms compared to that of matched firms
coinciding with tariff reductions. Moreover, the bulk of the investment drop materializes during
the year that immediately follows the event. In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, we extend the sample
to include two years and three years before and after the tariff cut, respectively. The coefficients
on CUT have marginally lower values of -0.043 and -0.027, but remain statistically significant.
3.2 Robustness tests
We perform several robustness tests that we report in Table 4. First, we replace the dependent
variable with capital expenditures scaled by total assets (Column 1), and with growth in net Prop-
erty, Plant, and Equipment (column 2). In both columns, the coefficient on CUT is negative and
statistically significant. Second, we modify the “dosage” of the increase in entry threat. Specifically,
we define that a tariff cut occurs in a specific industry-year when a negative change in tariffs is one
(small change in entry threat) or five (large change in entry threat) times larger than the average
tariff change in that industry. We then estimate the baseline specification for these samples. The
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 present the results (labeled cut#1 and cut#5). We find a small and
insignificant coefficient for cut#1 (-0.010), where the average tariff decreases by 1.44 percentage
points (from 4.85% to 3.41%). By contrast, the estimated investment reaction is much larger and
statistically significant for cut#5 (-0.070), where the average tariff drops by 3.45 percentage points
(from 5.49% to 2.04%).
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[Insert Table 4 about here]
Third, we repeat the baseline experiment during placebo periods that precede the reduction of
tariffs. We use years (-4) and (-3) relative to the actual event years to sort firms into treated and
matched firms. We then examine the change in investment from year (-4) to year (-2) and from
year (-3) to year (-1). We perform these falsification tests using the exact same sampling criteria
and matching variables as we use in the baseline tests. The Columns 5 and 6 present the results.
The coefficient on CUT is small and not significantly different from zero in these two columns,
consistent with our interpretation that the observed changes in investment really stem from tariff
reductions.
While we show in the Internet Appendix that our results are unlikely to be driven by specific
industry effects (see the parallel trend tests), they might still be affected by the endogeneity of trade
policy to lobbying activity. To help lessen this concern, we focus our attention on tariff reductions
that are part of multilateral agreements. As argued by Krugman, Obsfeld, and Melitz (2012), lob-
bying groups are less likely to influence tariff changes resulting from multilateral trade agreements.
Indeed, the multi-country-industry dimension of such agreements limits the ability of government
officials to acquiesce to political pressures. Furthermore, the participation of international insti-
tutions imposes rules and formal obligations that restrict the influence of special interest groups.
For that reason, these reductions can be viewed as relatively “more” exogenous than reductions
resulting from bilateral agreements. Hence, we only consider years around the GSP, GATT, and
NAFTA multilateral trade agreements and keep the following years in the analysis: 1976-1983, and
1993-1995. This focus on these trade events reduces our sample to 1,892 observations. Column 7
of Table 4 displays the result, which is very similar to the baseline result.
Finally, we change the matching method in two ways. First, we implement a propensity score
matching approach using the same matching variables as in the nonparametric matching (Tobin’s
q, the logarithm of total assets, cash flow, cash holdings, and long-term leverage).13 Second, we
13Note that there is almost no overlap between the matched samples obtained from the propensity score matching
and nonparametric matching (Mahalanobis). Only fourteen matched firms are present in both samples.
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repeat our baseline nonparametric matching but match on relative-to-industry median covariates,
as in Gormley and Matsa (2012). Columns 8 and 9 of Table 4 indicate that these changes in the
matching procedure have no bearing on the results.
3.3 Cross-industry heterogeneity
We estimate firms’ investment response (βˆ) separately for each of the ninety-one events. Because
for some events (industry-year combinations) the number of treated and matched observations is
insufficient to obtain statistically meaningful estimates, we also include the matched observations
from other events occurring in the same year. We present the results of these estimations in Figure
4: the top panel displays the estimated βˆ across events (sorted in ascending order), and the bottom
panel plots the associated t-statistics.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 reveals a substantial variation across industries, as firms’ investment response to tariff
cuts varies between -0.90 and +0.75. Yet despite this large heterogeneity, Figure 4 indicates that a
vast majority of firms in our sample reduce investment following tariff cuts. We observe that two-
thirds of the events exhibit negative βˆ (58 out of 91), 33 of which are significant at the 10% level,
and 24 are significant at the 5% level. In line with our baseline results, the cross-event average for
βˆ is -0.050 and the median is -0.049. Moreover, we observe increases in investment for thirty-three
events. But only eleven industries feature increases in investment that are significant at the 5%
level. These are diverse industries including for instance “Machine Tools”, “Ophthalmic Goods”,
“Mobile Homes”, or “Flat Glass”.14 Besides the fact that half of these investment-increasing events
appear in 1976, these industries do not seem to be otherwise related in any systematic way.
14These events include the following SIC industries (years): 3541 (1979), 3851 (1976), 2891 (1979), 3559 (1995),
3711 (1986), 3211 (1976), 3555 (1995), 2451 (1993), 3949 (1976), 3944 (1976), 2531 (1976).
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4 What Explains the Decline in Investment?
Our analysis so far shows that, all else equal, increased entry threat causes incumbents to sig-
nificantly reduce investment. As explained in Section 1, this result could be consistent with a
strategic explanation, but also with a nonstrategic explanation whereby tariff cuts modify firms’
future growth opportunities and business uncertainty. This section attempts to better understand
why do firms decrease investment following tariff cuts.
4.1 Changes in growth prospects and uncertainty
To assess the possibility that our findings are due to changing investment opportunities and un-
certainty, we include additional proxies in the baseline specification. We use risk-adjusted stock
returns (from a market model) and sales growth as proxies for investment opportunities, and id-
iosyncratic stock return volatility (estimated using weekly returns) as a proxy for profit uncertainty.
We conjecture that if the observed decline of investment only reflects a nonstrategic adjustment to
lower investment opportunities or higher uncertainty, we should observe a large reduction of the
estimated coefficient on CUT once we add these extra control variables.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Column 1 of Table 5 indicates that adding these additional proxies only slightly attenuates the
magnitude of the investment response, which remains strongly negative (-0.052) and significant. As
an alternative way to control for the impact of changing investment opportunities and uncertainty,
we include two-digit SIC×year fixed effects. These additional fixed effects capture any time-varying
unobserved factors that are common across all firms in a broadly defined industry, such as industry
and time-specific shocks to the profitability of investment. Column 2 indicates that our conclusion
remains unaffected.
Because investment opportunities are notoriously hard to measure, the proxies we use (especially
Tobin’s q) could contain measurement errors (see Erickson and Whited, 2002, 2012). A concern
could thus arise if measurement errors become larger, and hence, “true” investment opportunities
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shrink after tariff reductions. This concern, however, is largely dispelled by the results in column
3, which reports estimates using the Erickson and Whited (2012) fifth-order moment estimator
to account for mismeasurement in proxies for firms’ investment opportunities. The estimated
investment response is barely affected by this change in estimation procedure.
While controlling for changes in growth prospects is important in our setting, the validity of our
baseline specification could be jeopardized by the presence of “bad controls.” Indeed, the inclusion
of bad controls in a difference-in-differences model–control variables that are themselves affected
by the treatment–can lead to biased inference (Roberts and Whited, 2012). The results reported
in Column 4 of Table 5 mitigate this concern as we estimate a similar drop in investment when we
exclude all control variables.15
Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest that the observed decline in investment is hard to reconcile
with a nonstrategic story in which the drop of investment following tariff cuts is solely reflecting
lower growth prospects or higher uncertainty, or a combination of these two explanations. Indeed,
the response of corporate investment to higher entry threat appears much larger than what may
be justified by observable changes in investment opportunities and uncertainty.
4.2 Strategic response to entry threat
To assess whether the decline in investment contains a strategic dimension, we rely on the the-
oretical predictions from Section 1 and assess how firms’ investment response varies across three
key elements of market structure (as summarized in Table 1): (1) whether competitive actions are
strategic substitutes or complements, (2) whether investment signals that incumbents will be soft
or tough competitors should entry occur, and (3) whether incumbents deter or accommodate entry.
4.2.1 The nature of strategic interactions. We rely on the characterization of Bulow,
Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) to distinguish between markets in which firms’ competitive
15We further show in the Internet Appendix that there are in fact little changes in several proxies for growth
prospects in response to tariff cuts. This further limits the risk of bad controls and reveals that the reduction of
investment cannot be solely a response to lower investment opportunities after tariff cuts.
18
actions are strategic substitutes or complements. Accordingly, the quantity of interest is the cross-
partial derivative of a firm’s value with respect to rivals’ competitive actions. A positive value
for the cross-partial derivative indicates competition in strategic complements, whereas a negative
value indicates competition in strategic substitutes. To approximate this cross-partial derivative
in the data, we use the competitive strategy measure (CSM) developed by Sundaram, John, and
John (1996). For a given firm, CSM is defined as the correlation between the ratio of the change
of its profits to the change of its sales, and the change in the combined sales of its rivals. As in
Chod and Lyandres (2011), we use quarterly data and compute this correlation for each firm-year
using rolling windows over the past five years. Next, we aggregate the CSM at the four-digit SIC
industry level by taking the average across all firms in each industry. A positive value for CSM
indicates that actions are strategic complements, and a negative value indicates that actions are
strategic substitutes.
We also use the sign of rivals’ market reactions to firms’ expansion decisions as proxies for the
cross-partial derivative. We focus on three types of “expansion” events: initial public offerings
(IPO), seasoned equity offering (SEO), and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). For each manufac-
turing industry, we collect the announcement dates of every such event over the period 1980-2005
from SDC Platinum. Then, for every event, we estimate the abnormal market reaction of rivals
(i.e., the other public firms in the industry) using a market-model with daily stock returns from
CRSP (based on 250 days rolling windows). We concentrate our analysis on cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) over a [-1,+1] window, where day 0 corresponds to the event announcement date,
and take the average market reaction for each industry and event type. We posit that average ri-
vals’ market reactions are linked to the sign of the cross-partial derivative: positive rivals’ reactions
reflect strategic complementarity, and negative reactions reflect strategic substitution.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
In Table 6 we separate treated firms based on the nature of strategic interactions in their market,
using the indicator variableDSUBSTITUTE = 1, when actions are substitutes, andDCOMPLEMENT =
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1, when actions are complements. The results show that the reduction of investment to tariff cuts
is concentrated in markets featuring competition in strategic substitutes: the coefficients on the
interaction CUT × DSUBSTITUTE are negative and significant across all specifications. In these
markets, the economic magnitude of the investment drop is substantial: it ranges between 9.7
and 12 percentage points. In sharp contrast, the coefficients on CUT × DCOMPLEMENT are in-
significant, indicating that investment in markets featuring competition in strategic complements is
largely insensitive to tariff reductions. Overall, the difference in firms’ investment response to tariff
cuts between markets in which action are strategic substitutes or complements is consistent with
firms’ response being strategic. If firms’ investment response solely reflects changes in investment
opportunities and uncertainty, there is no reason why the observed reduction of investment should
vary systematically with the nature of strategic interactions.
4.2.2 Soft or tough investment signal The second element of market structure predicted by
strategic models to influence the sign of firms’ response to higher entry threat is whether investment
signals to entrants that incumbents will turn into soft or tough competitors if entry occurs. As this
element depends on the anticipations of the potential entrants, it is difficult to capture empirically.
Nevertheless, we rely on incumbents’ access to financial resources as an indirect proxy. We argue
that using limited financial resources to invest today makes financially weak firms credibly look
like “softer” rivals, as they may not be able to fund future aggressive competitive actions.16 In
contrast, perfectly unconstrained firms will always be able to finance future actions, so that lowering
investment is not a credible signal. On this ground, we consider four variables to measure whether
firms have limited financial resources: the index of financial constraints developed by Whited and
Wu (2006), the index of external finance dependence of Rajan and Zingales (1998), the presence
of a credit rating, and the aggregate borrowing costs captured by the three-month Treasury-bill
rate. For each variable we assign treated firms into two groups based on median splits: we classify
firms into a “soft” subgroup when they face tighter financing constraints (DSOFT = 1), and into a
16Supporting this hypothesis, Fre´sard (2010) shows that financially strong firms gain market shares at the expense
of their rivals, and that this effect is stronger when rivals face tighter financing constraints.
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“tough” subgroup when they face little constraints (DTOUGH = 1).
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Table 7 indicates that the negative effect of increased entry threat on investment is largely
concentrated among firms that are more financially constrained. The coefficients on CUT ×DSOFT
are significantly more negative than those on CUT × DTOUGH for three out of four proxies. For
instance, we estimate a 11.5 percentage points reduction of investment following tariff cuts for firms
that are more constrained based on the Whited and Wu (2006) index, compared to a 3.4-percentage-
points reduction for firms that are less constrained. Similarly, the reduction of investment is
magnified in periods characterized by high borrowing costs. Overall results in Table 7 suggest
that incumbents react to increased entry threat by reducing investment primarily when investment
signals softer future competitive behavior. Hence, incumbents keep financial resources to withstand
potential competition by entrants.17 In contrast, when investment signals tough future behavior,
we detect little change in investment following increased entry threat.
4.2.3 Deterrence or accommodation. To empirically capture situations in which incum-
bents are more likely to attempt to deter entry (as opposed to accommodate entry), we consider
several measures of barriers to entry. We conjecture that deterring the entry of foreign rivals is
more costly–and hence less optimal–when rivals face fewer barriers besides import tariffs. We con-
sider five proxies for entry barriers. First, we follow Bain (1956) and Sutton (1991, who suggest
that a high degree of product differentiation helps firms preserving their competitive advantage.
We consider patent protection as a proxy for product differentiation. We measure whether a firm’s
products are legally protected by using the logarithm of the number of patent citations it owns
from the NBER patent database, and aggregate this measure to the industry level.
Second, we use the specificity of industries’ assets. Bain (1956) and Williamson (1975) argue
that specific assets are more difficult to acquire, develop, and imitate and hence provide incumbents
17In unreported results, we show that financially constrained firms significantly increase their cash holdings in
response to tariff cuts. This is further consistent with firms willing to maintain financial strength when entry threat
increases.
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with an absolute cost advantage that makes entry more difficult. We empirically capture asset
specificity using the measure of asset redeployability developed by Kim and Kung (2014) that
accounts for the “usability” of assets across industries, based on the 1992 Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) capital flow table, which breaks down the capital expenditures of industries into
a variety of asset categories (e.g., software, cars, or office equipment). Following Kim and Kung
(2014), we define an asset redeployability score as the proportion of industries by which a given
asset is used. Intuitively, the more industries use a given asset in their production process, the
higher is its redeployability and, by analogy, the lower its specificity. We compute industry-level
specificity as the value-weighted average of the asset redeployability score for each industry.
Third, we use the intensity of product market competition to measure entry barriers, conjec-
turing that a higher degree of competition indicates lower barriers. We use the fitted Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) at the three-digit SIC level obtained from the Hoberg-Phillips data library
to measure competition intensity.18
Fourth, we use the financial strength of potential entrants. We use the cash reserves of foreign
rivals to measure their financial strength. Based on data from Worldscope, we consider firms located
in forty-five countries and compute for each four-digit SIC industry the average cash-to-asset ratio
across these countries (represents 95% of the world (ex-U.S.) GDP). We posit that entry obstacles
are lower for foreign rivals that are financially strong.
Finally, we measure entry barriers by directly estimating each industry’s sensitivity of import
penetration to tariff changes. We hypothesis that we should observe relatively less entry following
tariff reductions in markets characterized by large (nontariff) barriers. We obtain industry-specific
sensitivities by regressing for each industry the change in import penetration from year t to t + 1
on the lagged change in import tariffs using the full sample from 1974 to 2005.19
18As explained in Hoberg and Phillips (2010), the fitted Herfindahl-Hirschman industry concentration ratio com-
bines Compustat data with Herfindahl data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As such, this measure covers private
and public firms and varies through time. We obtain similar results when we use a Compustat-based HHI (at the
three- or four-digit SIC level), or the HHI provided by the Census of Manufacturers that is updated every five years.
19For each industry, we standardize changes in import tariffs by the standard deviation to obtain sensitivities in
comparable units.
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[Insert Table 8 about here]
Table 8 reveals that firms’ response to tariff cuts is significantly related to the costs of limiting
entry. We find that the reduction of investment is only present when entry cost are relatively
low–when incumbents are less protected by entry barriers. For instance, firms with no patents
(measured prior to the tariff cuts) experience a larger drop in investment. The coefficient estimates
on CUT ×DLOW is -0.082. Tariff reductions have virtually no impact on the investment of firms
with more patents. Similarly, we observe that firms reduce investment more when they operate in
more competitive industries, are facing foreign rivals with more cash, or are in industries where
tariff reductions are followed by larger increases in import penetration.
Finally, firms operating in industries characterized by more redeployable assets reduce invest-
ment significantly more after large reductions of tariffs compared to firms in industries relying on
more specific assets. Remarkably, our results contrast with the findings of Kim and Kung (2014).
They document that, following increases in uncertainty, firms reduce investment more if they oper-
ate in industries in which assets are more specific, consistent with the low redeployability of assets
inducing firms to “wait and see” when uncertainty rises. We find the opposite response following
shocks that increase entry threat, consistent with the idea that industry-specific assets help shield-
ing incumbents against potential entrants. Hence, these findings suggest that the decrease in firms’
investment cannot be solely explained by an increase in uncertainty.
4.2.4 Interpretation and further tests. The substantial variation of firms’ investment
response across market structures allows us to paint a more complete picture on the reasons why
firms curtail capital investment in response to increased entry threat. Notably, across the sixteen
cross-sectional partitions described already we find no instance in which incumbents significantly
increase investment following tariff cuts.20 More importantly, the reduction of investment is largely
concentrated in specific market structures. Incumbents reduce investment in situations in which the
competitive actions are strategic substitutes, when the costs of deterring entry are high, and when
20In unreported results, we use quartile-splits instead of median-splits and obtain virtually identical results. Also,
our conclusions remain unaffected if we use interactions instead of sample splits.
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investment makes incumbents look soft. Taken together, this evidence suggests that incumbents
react to lower entry costs by decreasing investment in an attempt to strategically accommodate
entry and to induce softer competitive behavior by foreign rivals. In the terminology of strategic
investment models, our estimates suggest that firms adopt a “lean and hungry look,” remaining
small and weak today in order to appear as tough competitors if entry occurs (Tirole, 1988).
[Insert Table 9 about here]
To provide further evidence for this strategic interpretation, we test the unique prediction that
incumbents should reduce investment when competitive actions are strategic substitutes and in-
vestment makes them look soft (see lower right corner of Table 1). To do so, we add the triple
interaction CUT × DSUBSTITUTE × DSOFT to our specification, including all simple terms and
interaction terms. We expect the coefficient to be negative. We estimate this augmented spec-
ification for each possible combination of our proxies for strategic substitutes and soft behavior
(4× 4) and display the results in Table 9. We only report the coefficients on the triple interaction
term to preserve space. In consistency with the “lean and hungry look” behavior, 15 coefficients
out of 16 are negative. Moreover, six coefficients are statistically significant. These tests reinforce
our conclusion that strategic considerations are important drivers of the reduction of investment
following tariff cuts.
5 Conclusion
We rely on large reductions of import tariffs that isolate exogenous variation in entry threat faced
by domestic incumbents to study how firms change capital investment when the threat of entry
suddenly increases. We document large reductions of investment in response to increased entry
threat. This effect is economically large, pervasive, and statistically robust. We further uncover a
large heterogeneity in the investment response across product markets. We find that the invest-
ment reductions are concentrated in product markets in which competitive actions are strategic
substitutes, in markets in which entry barriers are low so that deterring entry is costly, and in
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situations in which additional investment makes the incumbents look soft. This variation across
market structures is consistent with the predictions of strategic investment models.
Our analysis indicates that interactions among firms in the product market have first-order
implications for firms’ investment. This role, in turn, largely depends on product market structures
and on firms’ competitive positions in their market. Consistent with capital investment encom-
passing a strategic dimension, our results point to several further questions. In particular, our
analysis remains silent on whether reductions of investment are effective and, if so, how they mold
product market dynamics ex post. Measuring these aspects is challenging, but has the potential to
shed light on whether firms actions really distort those of rivals. Similarly, it would be interesting
to study how various product market structures and the nature of firms’ interactions affect the
equilibrium relation between investment and asset prices.21 We plan to address these and other
related questions in future research.
21See, for instance, Aguerrevere (2009) or Bustamante (2015) for recent theoretical connections between strategic
investment and asset prices.
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Appendix
A.1 Model of Entry Costs and Investment
This Appendix formally develops the predictions that we describe in Section 1 of the paper in the
situation in which the incumbent behaves strategically. To do so, we consider a simple two-period,
two-firm model as in Tirole (1988, chapter 8.3). Firm 1 is an incumbent and firm 2 is an entrant.
In period 1, the incumbent chooses a level of capital I. Firm 2 observes I and decides whether
to enter. If it does not enter it makes zero profit, and the incumbent enjoys a monopoly position
and makes monopoly profits (Π1m). If firm 2 enters, the firms compete in the second period and
make simultaneous second-period choices x1 and x2. The second period competition game could
be a` la Cournot, where firms choose quantities, or a` la Bertrand, where firms choose prices. The
second period profits are given by Π1(I, x1, x2) and Π
2(I, x1, x2). By convention, we assume that
firm 2’s entry costs φ are part of Π2 and that, all else equal, Π2 is strictly decreasing in φ.22 We
further assume that these profit functions are differentiable. The post-entry choice of x1 and x2
are determined by a Nash equilibrium [x?1(I), x
?
2(I)], where the superscript
? indicates equilibrium
values.23
The object of interest in this context is the incumbent’s first-period equilibrium choice of I
and how I varies when entry costs decrease. Entry is deterred if the incumbent chooses I such
that Π2(I, x?1(I), x
?
2(I)) ≤ 0. In contrast, entry is accommodated if Π2(I, x?1(I), x?2(I)) > 0. Tirole
(1988) shows that the incumbent’s first-period equilibrium choice of I depends on three elements.
First, it depends on whether the incumbent finds it advantageous to deter or to accommodate
entry. Second, it depends on whether investment makes the incumbent tough or soft. Third, it
depends on the type of competition in the second period (Cournot or Bertrand), which determines
whether the strategic choices x1 and x2 are strategic substitutes (i.e., quantities) or complements
(i.e., prices).24
22Entry costs could be either fixed or variable (as an increasing function of output).
23Following Tirole (1988), we assume that this equilibrium is unique and stable.
24We follow the tradition in the literature and assume that quantities are strategic substitutes and prices are
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To understand the effect of a decrease of entry costs on I in this model ( ∂I∂φ), we follow Tirole
(1988) and consider separately the case in which the incumbent seeks to deter entry and the case
in which the incumbent seeks to accommodate entry.
A.2. Deterrence of Entry
To deter entry, the incumbent chooses a level of I such that the entry of firm 2 is unprofitable
(Π2(I, x?1(I), x
?
2(I)) ≤ 0). Following Tirole (1988), we can write the effect of I on Π2 as
dΠ2
dI
=
∂Π2
∂I
+
∂Π2
∂x1
dx?1
dI
. (2)
By modifying I, the incumbent could directly affect the entrant’s profit (∂Π2/∂I). Assuming that
the choice of I only affects the incumbent’s production function, we have ∂Π2/∂I = 0. Any effect
of I on the entrant’s profit originates in the strategic effect, which comes from the fact that I
modifies the incumbent’s post-entry behavior (by dx?1/dI), and thus affects the entrant’s profit (in
proportion of ∂Π2/∂x1).
To see the effect of a decrease in entry cost on the incumbent’s optimal investment, let us
imagine that for some initial entry cost φa, we are at an equilibrium given by Ia, x?,a1 (I), and
x?,a2 (I) so that entry is just deterred (Π
2 = 0). What happens to I if, all else equal, entry costs
decrease from φa to φb? Because Ia, x?,a1 (I
a), and x?,a2 (I
a) is the no-entry equilibrium for initial
entry costs φa and Π2 is strictly decreasing in φ, we have
Π2(Ia, x?,a1 (I
a), x?,a2 (I
a), φa) = 0 < Π2(Ia, x?,a1 (I
a), x?,a2 (I
a), φb). (3)
Hence, with entry costs φb < φa, Ia does not prevent entry. The new no-entry equilibrium in-
vestment Ib could be either larger or smaller than Ia. This depends only on whether investment
makes the incumbent tough or soft. To see this, consider first the case in which the second-period
competition game is in quantity (Cournot) so that firms’ choice of quantities x1 and x2 are strate-
gic substitutes.25 When competition is in quantities, the incumbent needs to commit to increase
strategic complements. This simplifies the exposition, but has no bearing on our conclusions.
25In other words, both firms’ reaction curves are downward sloping, or equivalently ∂Πi/∂xj < 0.
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second-period quantity x1 to lower the entrant’s profit (∂Π
2/∂x1 < 0). Therefore, investment
makes the incumbent tough when dx?1/dI > 0 and soft when dx
?
1/dI < 0. As a result, to prevent
entry when φb < φa the incumbent needs to choose Ib > Ia if investment makes her tough, and
Ib < Ia if investment makes her soft.
Proposition 1. In the entry-deterrence case where competitive actions are strategic substi-
tutes, the incumbent should react to a decrease in entry cost by increasing investment if invest-
ment makes her tough (∂I/∂φ < 0), and by decreasing investment if investment makes her soft
(∂I/∂φ > 0).
Alternatively. when the second-period competition game is in prices (Bertrand), firms’ choice of
prices x1 and x2 are strategic complements.
26 When firms compete in prices, the incumbent needs
to commit to decrease second-period prices to lower the entrant’s profit (∂Π2/∂x1 > 0). Therefore,
investment makes the incumbent tough when dx?1/dI < 0 and soft when dx
?
1/dI > 0. Hence, to
prevent entry when φb < φa, the incumbent also needs to choose Ib > Ia if investment makes her
tough, and Ib < Ia if investment makes her soft.
Proposition 2. In the entry-deterrence case where competitive actions are strategic comple-
ments, the incumbent should react to a decrease in entry cost by increasing investment if invest-
ment makes her tough (∂I/∂φ < 0), and by decreasing investment if investment makes her soft
(∂I/∂φ > 0).
A.3 Accommodation of Entry
Now, suppose that deterring entry is too costly for the incumbent. Unlike in the entry-deterrence
case in which the choice of I was dictated by the entrant’s second-period profit (which had to be
equalized to zero), it is dictated by the incumbent’s profit in the entry-accommodation case. The
incumbent thus chooses I to maximize second-period profit (Π1(I, x?1, x
?
2)). Following Tirole (1988),
26In other words, both firms’ reaction curves are upward sloping, or equivalently ∂Πi/∂xj > 0.
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we can write the total effect of I on Π1 as
dΠ1
dI
=
∂Π1
∂I
+
∂Π1
∂x2
dx?2
dI
. (4)
The total effect of I on Π1 is comprised of two effects. The direct effect is ∂Π
1/∂I, and the
strategic effect comes from the influence of I on the entrant’s second-period choice of x2.
27 To
understand the effect of a decrease of entry costs on investment in the entry-accommodation case,
imagine that for some initial entry costs φa we are at an equilibrium given by Ia, x?,a1 (I
a), and
x?,a2 (I
a) so that the incumbent’s second-period profit are maximized. What happens to I if, all else
equal, entry costs decrease from φa to φb? Because the triplet Ia, x?,a1 (I
a), and x?,a2 (I
a) forms the
entry-accommodation equilibrium for the initial φa and Π2 is strictly decreasing in φ, we have
Π1(Ia, x?,a1 (I
a), x?,a2 (I
a), φa) > Π1(Ia, x?,a1 (I
a), x?,a2 (I
a), φb). (5)
Hence, with entry costs φb, Ia does not maximize Π1. The incumbent needs to choose a new entry-
accommodation equilibrium investment Ib that increases its second-period profit Π1 so as to reach a
maximum (i.e., a new equilibrium). Again, Ib could be either larger or smaller than Ia. Unlike the
entry-deterrence case, this depends not only on whether investment makes the incumbent tough or
soft, but also on whether the choice variables x1 and x2 are strategic substitutes or complements.
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To see this, let us rewrite Equation (4) as
dΠ1
dI
=
∂Π1
∂I
+ (
∂Π1
∂x2
)(
dx?2
dx1
)(
dx?1
dI
). (6)
Consider first the case in which the second-period competition game is in quantity (Cournot)
so that firms’ choice of quantities x1 and x2 are strategic substitutes. When competition is in
quantities, the incumbent’s second-period profit decreases when the entrant chooses to produce
more, so ∂Π1/∂x2 < 0. Similarly, when actions are strategic substitutes, the reaction curves are
27Note that the presentation in Tirole (1988) compares the case in which firms act strategically to the case in which
they do not. Hence, the direct effect is ignored as this direct effect exists in both cases. This is different for us as we
focus on the effect of a change in entry cost when firms act strategically. Hence, we cannot ignore the direct effect.
28Similarly to Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), we assume that the second-period actions of both firms have the same
nature, such that ∂Π1/∂x2 and ∂Π
2/∂x2 have the same sign.
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downward sloping, so dx?2/dx1 < 0. Moreover, with firms competing in quantities, investment
makes the incumbent tough when dx?1/dI > 0 (and when ∂Π
1/∂I > 0 ) and soft when dx?1/dI < 0
(and ∂Π1/∂I < 0). As a result, the sign of dΠ1/dI (in Equations (3) and (5)) is positive when
actions are strategic substitutes and investment makes the incumbent tough. In this case, the
incumbent should optimally choose Ib > Ia when φb < φa. In contrast, the sign of dΠ1/dI is
negative when actions are strategic substitutes and investment makes the incumbent soft, implying
that the incumbent should optimally choose Ib < Ia when φb < φa.
Proposition 3. In the entry-accommodation case where competitive actions are strategic
substitutes, the incumbent should react to a decrease in entry cost by increasing investment if
investment makes her tough (∂I/∂φ < 0), and by decreasing investment if investment makes her
soft (∂I/∂φ > 0).
When the second-period competition game is in prices (Bertrand), firms’ choice of prices x1 and
x2 are strategic complements. In this case, the incumbent’s second-period profit decreases when the
entrant chooses to lower prices, so ∂Π1/∂x2 > 0. Similarly, when actions are strategic complements,
the reaction curves are upward sloping, so dx?2/dx1 > 0. Moreover, when firms compete in prices,
investment makes the incumbent tough when dx?1/dI < 0 (and when ∂Π
1/∂I < 0 ) and soft
when dx?1/dI > 0 (and ∂Π
1/∂I > 0). As a result, the sign of dΠ1/dI (in Equations (3) and (5))
is negative when actions are strategic complements and investment makes the incumbent tough,
implying that the incumbent should optimally choose Ib < Ia when φb < φa. In contrast, the sign
of dΠ1/dI is positive when actions are strategic complements and investment makes the incumbent
soft, implying that the incumbent should optimally choose Ib > Ia when φb < φa.
Proposition 4. In the entry-accommodation case in which competitive actions are strategic
complements, the incumbent should react to a decrease in entry cost by decreasing investment if
investment makes her tough (∂I/∂φ > 0), and by increasing investment if investment makes her
soft (∂I/∂φ < 0).
Table 1 in the paper summarizes the four propositions.
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Table A1. Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Investment Capital expenditures (CAPX) at time t+ 1 divided by net PPE at time t
Cash to assets Cash and short term investments (CHE) divided by total assets
LT leverage Long-term debt (DLTT) divided by total assets
Tobin’s q Total assets minus common equity (CEQ) plus the market value
of equity (CSHO×PRCC F) divided by total assets
CF to assets Income before extraordinary items (IBC) divided by total assets
Tariff Duties collected at U.S. Custom divided by the Free-On-Board custom
value of imports at the four-digit SIC industry. The data are
available on Peter Schott’s Web Site
Cut#x Dummy variable equal to one if the reduction in the tariff is
more than x times larger than the average tariff reduction
in the industry, and zero otherwise
CUTj,t Dummy variable equal to one if industry j has experienced a
tariff cut by time t
Aggr. capital stock Aggregate capital stock in USD (NBER-CES database)
Return Abnormal return (alpha) from the market model
Volatility Idiosyncratic volatility from the market model
Sales growth Growth in sales (SALE) from year t− 1 to year t
CSM Competitive strategy measure. Correlation between the ratio of the change
in firm’s profit to the change of its sales, and the change in the
combined sales of its rivals (Sundaram, John, and John, 1996)
CARIPO Cumulative abnormal returns of industry rivals around a firm’s IPO announcement
CARSEO Cumulative abnormal returns of industry rivals around a firm’s SEO announcement
CARM&A Cumulative abnormal returns of industry rivals around a firm’s M&A announcement
Citations Median log number of citations in an industry
Redeployability For each industry, the value weighted average of the proportion of
industries that use a given asset (BEA capital flow data)
HHI Fitted HHI at the three-digit SIC level obtained from the Hoberg and
Phillips data library
Foreign cash Average cash-to-asset ratio at the four-digit SIC industry level of foreign
public firms (Worldscope data)
WW-index Index of financing constraints from Whited and Wu (2006)
External dependence Index of external finance dependence of Rajan and Zingales (1998)
Rating Dummy variable for the presence of a credit rating
3-month Treasury-bill Three-month Treasury-bill rate
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Table 1. Market structures and investment
This table presents the predictions that are discussed in Section 1 and formally derived from the
model in the Appendix. The table shows how an incumbent firm should optimally modify its in-
vestment when entry costs decrease, that is, when import tariffs drop. The predictions depend on
(1) whether competitive actions are strategic substitutes or complements, (2) whether the incum-
bent wants to deter or accommodate entry, and (3) whether investment signals that the incumbent
will be a soft or tough competitor should entry occur. The table summarizes the predictions as a
function of these elements.
Expected sign of investment response? Investment makes incumbent:
tough soft
Deter Accommodate Deter Accommodate
Strategic complements > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
Strategic substitutes > 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for the main variables in the paper. The baseline sample
consists of 1,116 treated and matched firms, respectively. In the year before a tariff cut, firms
are matched by Tobin’s q, the logarithm of total assets, cash flow to total assets, cash to total
assets, and long-term debt to total assets. The table reports statistics for the matching variables
and for investment (capital expenditures over lagged net PP&E). Please refer to the Appendix for
a definition of the variables. The last column shows the p-value from a two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (K-S test) for equality of distribution functions across treated and matched firms.
The null hypothesis is that the distributions are equal. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Obs Mean 25% Median 75% K-S test
Tobin’s q treated 1,116 2.06 1.04 1.50 2.37 0.48
matched 1,116 1.98 1.03 1.43 2.26
Log(total assets) treated 1,116 4.06 2.69 3.76 5.17 0.98
matched 1,116 4.07 2.71 3.74 5.22
CF to assets treated 1,116 -3.00% -1.86% 4.90% 9.25% 0.22
matched 1,116 -2.13% -0.16% 5.30% 9.11%
Cash to assets treated 1,116 17.51% 3.02% 8.89% 24.37% 0.26
matched 1,116 16.88% 2.95% 8.21% 23.22%
LT leverage treated 1,116 14.01% 1.39% 9.77% 21.84% 0.89
matched 1,116 13.85% 0.99% 9.79% 21.28%
Investment treated 1,116 48.34% 16.16% 28.84% 55.94% 0.01**
matched 1,116 42.66% 14.63% 25.47% 46.08%
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Table 3. Entry threat and corporate investment: Average response
This table presents the estimates from difference-in-differences regressions for corporate investment
around import tariff reductions (tariff cuts). The dependent variable is capital expenditures scaled
by net PP&E (except in Column 2). CUT is a dummy variable equal to one if a given industry has
experienced a tariff cut by time t. The sample comprises treated and matched firms that experience
a significant import tariff reduction between 1974 and 2005. In the year before a tariff cut, treated
firms are matched by Tobin’s q, the logarithm of total assets, cash flow to total assets, cash to total
assets, and long-term debt to total assets. In the baseline specification (Column 1), we keep treated
and matched observations from one year before and one year after the tariff cut, and we use tariff
cuts that are larger than three times the average tariff reduction in an industry. In Column 2, the
dependent variable is the growth rate of the capital stock at the industry level, and the specification
is estimated at the four-digit SIC industry level. Column 3 extends the sample to include treated
and matched observations from two and one years before and after the tariff cut. Column 4 extends
the sample to include treated and matched observations from three, two, and one years before and
after the tariff cut. All specifications include year and firm fixed effects, and Tobin’s q, the logarithm
of total assets, and cash flow to total assets as control variables. Please refer to the Appendix for a
definition of the variables. Standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and within industry-year
clustering are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Specification: Baseline Aggregate (-2/+2) (-3/+3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CUT -0.072*** -0.006** -0.043*** -0.027**
(0.023) (0.002) (0.014) (0.012)
Tobin’s q 0.060*** 0.001 0.063*** 0.063***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
Log(total assets) -0.038* 0.001 -0.059*** -0.057***
(0.021) (0.003) (0.016) (0.012)
CF to assets 0.221*** 0.037* 0.269*** 0.258***
(0.082) (0.021) (0.045) (0.033)
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,264 383 8,275 11,873
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.59 0.30 0.28
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Table 5. Changes in growth opportunities and uncertainty
This table presents the estimates from difference-in-differences regressions for corporate investment
around import tariff reductions (tariff cuts). The dependent variable is capital expenditures scaled
by net PP&E. CUT is a dummy variable equal to one if a given industry has experienced a tariff
cut by time t. The sample comprises treated and matched firms that experience a significant import
tariff reduction between 1974 and 2005. In the year before a tariff cut, treated firms are matched by
Tobin’s q, the logarithm of total assets, cash flow to total assets, cash to total assets, and long-term
debt to total assets. We keep treated and matched observations from one year before and one
year after the tariff cut, and we use tariff cuts that are larger than three times the average tariff
reduction in an industry. Column 1 estimates the baseline specification with additional controls for
growth options and uncertainty (risk-adjusted stock returns, sales growth, and idiosyncratic stock
return volatility). Column 2 estimates the baseline specification including firm and SIC2×year
fixed effects. The specification in Column 3 is estimated using the fifth-order GMM estimator from
Erickson and Whited (2002, 2012). Column 4 estimates the baseline specification without control
variables. Please refer to the Appendix for a definition of the variables. Standard errors adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and within industry-year clustering are in parentheses below the coefficient
estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Specification: Controls SIC2×Year FE GMM No controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CUT -0.052** -0.089*** -0.065*** -0.089***
(0.022) (0.029) (0.020) (0.024)
Tobin’s q 0.074*** 0.057*** 0.260***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.32)
Log(total assets) -0.080*** -0.039 -0.009
(0.026) (0.025) (0.007)
CF to assets 0.052 0.201** 0.566***
(0.060) (0.080) (0.077)
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes no yes
Observations 3,486 4,264 4,264 4,264
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.29 0.26
p-value (χ2) 0.02
36
Table 6. Market structures: Nature of strategic interactions
This table presents the estimates from difference-in-differences regressions for corporate investment
around import tariff reductions (tariff cuts). The dependent variable is capital expenditures scaled
by net PP&E. CUT is a dummy variable equal to one if a given industry has experienced a tariff
cut by time t. The sample comprises treated and matched firms that experience a significant import
tariff reduction between 1974 and 2005. In the year before a tariff cut, treated firms are matched
by Tobin’s q, the logarithm of total assets, cash flow to total assets, cash to total assets, and long-
term debt to total assets. We separate treated firms based on the nature of strategic interactions
in their market, using the indicator variable DSUBSTITUTE = 1 when actions are substitutes,
and DCOMPLEMENT = 1 when actions are strategic complements. We use four variables to sort
markets into strategic substitutes and complements. First, we use the competitive strategy measure
(CSM). A positive value for CSM indicates that actions are strategic complements, while a negative
value indicates that actions are strategic substitutes. The remaining three variables are based on
the sign of rivals’ market reactions to IPOs, SEOs, or mergers and acquisitions. Positive rivals’
reactions indicate that actions are strategic complements, while negative reactions reflect strategic
substitution. Please refer to the Appendix for a definition of the variables. The bottom of the table
reports the p-values of a Wald test that tests whether the estimated coefficients (i) and (ii) are equal.
All specifications include year and firm fixed effects, and Tobin’s q, the logarithm of total assets,
and cash flow to total assets as control variables. Standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and within industry-year clustering are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The symbols
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Sorting variable: CSM CARIPO CARSEO CARM&A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CUT × DSUBSTITUTE (i) -0.120*** -0.097*** -0.112*** -0.109***
(0.036) (0.030) (0.035) (0.031)
CUT × DCOMPLEMENT (ii) -0.033 -0.038 -0.026 -0.025
(0.023) (0.031) (0.023) (0.025)
Control variables yes yes yes yes
Year and firms FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,264 4,025 4,204 4,239
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32
p-value (i)=(ii) 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03
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Table 7. Market structures: Soft or tough behavior
This table presents the estimates from difference-in-differences regressions for corporate investment
around import tariff reductions (tariff cuts). The dependent variable is capital expenditures scaled
by net PP&E. CUT is a dummy variable equal to one if a given industry has experienced a tariff
cut by time t. The sample comprises treated and matched firms that experience a significant import
tariff reduction between 1974 and 2005. In the year before a tariff cut, treated firms are matched by
Tobin’s q, the logarithm of total assets, cash flow to total assets, cash to total assets, and long-term
debt to total assets. We use measures of financing constraints to proxy for whether investment
makes incumbents look soft or tough. We separate treated firms based on their access to financing,
using the indicator variable DSOFT = 1 when their access is low, and DTOUGH = 1 when their
access is high. We assign treated industries into the soft group if the Whited and Wu (2006) index
is above the median, the index of external finance dependence of Rajan and Zingales (1998) is above
the median, the firm does not have a credit rating, and the three-month Treasury-bill rate is above
the median, and into the tough group otherwise. Please refer to the Appendix for a definition of
the variables. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of a Wald test that tests whether the
estimated coefficients (i) and (ii) are equal. All specifications include year and firm fixed effects, and
Tobin’s q, the logarithm of total assets, and cash flow to total assets as control variables. Standard
errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and within industry-year clustering are in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Sorting variable: WW index External dep. Rating 3-month Treasury-bill
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CUT × DSOFT (i) -0.115*** -0.108*** -0.057 -0.120***
(0.034) (0.038) (0.035) (0.030)
CUT × DTOUGH (ii) -0.034 -0.046* -0.002 -0.039
(0.022) (0.025) (0.028) (0.032)
Control variables yes yes yes yes
Year and firm FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,234 4,264 4,264 4,264
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32
p-value (i)=(ii) 0.02 0.16 0.10 0.06
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Table 8. Market structures: Deterrence or accommodation
This table presents the estimates from difference-in-differences regressions for corporate investment
around import tariff reductions (tariff cuts). The dependent variable is capital expenditures scaled
by net PP&E. CUT is a dummy variable equal to one if a given industry has experienced a tariff
cut by time t. The sample comprises treated and matched firms that experience a significant
import tariff reduction between 1974 and 2005. In the year before a tariff cut, treated firms are
matched by Tobin’s q, the logarithm of total assets, cash flow to total assets, cash to total assets,
and long-term debt to total assets. We separate treated firms based on the entry barriers in their
markets, using the indicator variable DLOW = 1 when barriers are low, and DHIGH = 1 when
barriers are high. We use five variables to sort markets into low and high barriers. In Column 1,
we assign treated industries into the low barrier group if the average number of patent citations
are below the median, and in the high barrier group otherwise. In Column 2, we assign treated
industries into the low barrier group if asset redeployability is above the median, and in the high
barrier group otherwise. In Columns 3 and 4, we assign firms into the low barrier group if the
fitted HHI of their industry is below the median, or the foreign rivals’ cash holdings are above the
median, respectively, and into the high barrier group otherwise. In Column 5, we assign firms into
the low barrier group when the sensitivity of a change in import penetration to changes in import
tariffs is below the median, and zero otherwise. Please refer to the Appendix for a definition of
the variables. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of a Wald test that tests whether the
estimated coefficients (i) and (ii) are equal. All specifications include year and firm fixed effects, and
Tobin’s q, the logarithm of total assets, and cash flow to total assets as control variables. Standard
errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and within industry-year clustering are in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Sorting variable: Citations Redeployability HHI Foreign cash IP sensit.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CUT × DLOW (i) -0.082*** -0.109*** -0.119*** -0.171** -0.101***
(0.024) (0.029) (0.031) (0.074) (0.029)
CUT × DHIGH (ii) -0.027 -0.041 -0.033 -0.048 -0.044
(0.051) (0.032) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes
Year and firm FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,264 4,264 4,151 2,425 4,129
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.31
p-value (i)=(ii) 0.29 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.15
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Table 9. Market structures: Interaction of soft behavior and strategic substitutes
This table presents the estimates from difference-in-differences regressions for corporate investment
around import tariff reductions (tariff cuts). The dependent variable is capital expenditures scaled
by net PP&E. We report the coefficient of the triple interaction between the dummies CUT , Soft,
and Substitute. CUT is a dummy variable equal to one if a given industry has experienced a tariff
cut by time t. Soft is a dummy equal to one if the Whited and Wu (2006) index is above the median,
the index of external finance dependence of Rajan and Zingales (1998) is above the median, the
firm does not have a credit rating, and the three-month Treasury-bill rate is above the median, and
zero otherwise. Substitute is a dummy equal to one if the competitive strategy measure (CSM)
has a negative value and if the rivals’ market reactions to IPOs, SEOs, or mergers and acquisitions
is negative, and zero otherwise. We only report the coefficient of the triple interaction term for
each combination of Soft and Substitute. The sample comprises treated and matched firms that
experience a significant import tariff reduction between 1974 and 2005. In the year before a tariff
cut, treated firms are matched by Tobin’s q, the logarithm of total assets, cash flow to total assets,
cash to total assets, and long-term debt to total assets. All specifications include year and firm
fixed effects, and Tobin’s q, the logarithm of total assets, and cash flow to total assets as control
variables. Please refer to the Appendix for a definition of the variables. Standard errors adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and within industry-year clustering are in parentheses below the coefficient
estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
WW index External dep. Rating 3-month Treasury-bill
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CSM -0.102 -0.180* -0.030 -0.072
(0.080) (0.103) (0.091) (0.087)
CARIPO -0.029 0.012 -0.031 -0.123
(0.081) (0.096) (0.082) (0.081)
CARSEO -0.209*** -0.100 -0.013 -0.216***
(0.065) (0.084) (0.071) (0.073)
CARM&A -0.213*** -0.245*** -0.179*** -0.038
(0.065) (0.085) (0.068) (0.081)
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Figure 1. Tariff reductions through time
This figure shows the number of tariff cuts by year for our sample firms. Tariffs are computed at
the four-digit SIC industry level as duties collected at U.S. Customs divided by the Free-On-Board
custom value of imports. An industry experiences a tariff cut if the tariff reduction is three times
larger than the average tariff reduction in that industry.
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Figure 2. Tariffs around tariff reductions
This figure shows the average tariff in event time for the sample of treated and matched industries.
The sample comprises 91 industries that experience a tariff cut between 1974 and 2005. Tariffs are
computed at the four-digit SIC industry level as duties collected at U.S. Customs divided by the
Free-On-Board customs value of imports.
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Figure 3. Investment response to tariff cuts
This figure shows how treated firms change investment relative to matched firms. The figure displays the
difference-in-differences estimates for the treatment dummy interacted with yearly dummies around the tariff
cut. The red lines indicate the 95% confidence interval. The sample comprises ninety-one industries that
experience a tariff cut between 1974 and 2005.
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Figure 4. Heterogeneity of investment response across industries
This figure shows the difference-in-differences estimates of CUT for each tariff cut event individually
(top) and the associated t-statistics (bottom). The sample comprises ninety-one industries that
experience a tariff cut between 1974 and 2005. The horizontal line in the top panel corresponds to
the average estimate of CUT across the ninety-one events.
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